Comparative Analysis of Abu Nuwas and al-Mutanabbi’s Temperaments and Styles

"Comparative Analysis of Abu Nuwas and Al-Mutanabbi’s Temperaments and Styles"

By Christa White

The Abbasid dynasty ruled a large empire centered in Baghdad, Iraq from the 750-1258 C.E., and out of this period arose two of the most acclaimed Arab poets, Abu Nuwas (756-814) and Al-Mutanabbi (915-965). Two books from the Makers of the Muslim World series published by Oneworld Publications, Abu Nuwas: Genius of Poetry, and Al-Mutanabbi: Voice of the Abbasid Poetic Ideal, illustrate the striking similarities of the poets’ lives despite the span of a century between them, including their humble origins, their lifetime of prestige, and untimely deaths. Perhaps the most significant shared accomplishment was the popular approval and patronage they gained despite their overt heterodoxy. The dispositions of both Abu Nuwas and al-Mutanabbi seem to depart from the pious contemporary values, making the acclamation they enjoyed all the more remarkable. This analysis contrasts the individual temperaments of Abu Nuwas and al-Mutanabbi, and how this influenced the unique poetic styles that ultimately earned them global acclamation.   Although there was inimitable talent possessed by both poets, the temperaments of Abu Nuwas and

al-Mutanabbi laid on opposite ends of the spectrum. Anecdotes of Abu Nuwas’ life describe

him as provocateur who was never short of a witty response. He spent a good deal of his time

as a drunken merrymaker, as revealed in the reoccurring Bacchic themes that played a role a

majority of his poems. Careless of consequences, he valued self expression, even the most

vulgar expressions, over his public image and at times over his career. For example, although

he clearly identified with the Muslim faith, he was incredibly irreverent to religious topics. In

writing, he would change sacred phrases such as “there is no god but God” to “there is no God

but bread”, and “Come to prayer!” to “Come to sleep- together!” These were not the words of a

heretic, but rather an agitator who fed off of his own controversy. This very lack of adherence

to customs and common decency, though, are in part what made Abu Nuwas’ poems so

captivating. Al-Mutanabbi, while outspoken, was far from the socialite that Abu Nuwas was.

His somber, competitive, and aloof demeanor and abstinence from wine alienated him from his
peers. Unlike Abu Nuwas, who supported himself writing poetry as a means to fund his
excessive drinking and escapades, al-Mutanabbi considered his career as a poet the defining
aspect of his life and thus took this role very seriously. Because of this, although al-Mutanabbi
lacked charisma, he was largely respected by his contemporaries purely for his poetic talent.
Al-Hatimi, a particular rival and literary critic that also served in the same court as
al-Mutanabbi in Baghdad, made it his special mission to critically dismantle al-Mutanabbi’s
new compositions. He was far better versed than al-Mutanabbi in rhetorical styles, such as
classifications of idioms, metaphors, and motifs. The critic found, however, that whatever
al-Mutanabbi’s craft lacked in technicalities, he more than compensated for in creativity.

Above all, the two poets fostered similarly tremendous egos. Propping up this ego was not of
paramount importance to Abu Nuwas, neither did it affect his success; however it is clear that
he did possess a sense of superiority in relation to his fellow poets. To a colleague, he is to
have once crassly stated, “I am unique. Many recite poetry like you .” His frequent attacks on
significant public figures and breach of taboo subjects show that he considered himself an
exception to the rules, partly due to the immunity his pure talent and popularity provided.

For al-Mutanabbi, hubris was a central aspect of his personality that more than once undermined his
achievements. Not the least of these conceited blunders was his alleged claim to prophethood,
complete with an original Quranic-like text and the performance of frivolous “miracles.” This is
supposedly the event that gave him his eponym, al-mutanabbi, “the would-be prophet.” In this
particular episode he and Abu Nuwas share yet another offense - sacrilege. This critical misstep in his
career as poet became the ammunition that patron Abu’l-Misk Kafur used to deny al-Mutanabbi a
promised governorship, a position he desperately vied for during his five-year residency in Egypt.
After years of evading al-Mutanabbi’s demands, Kafur finally outrightly denied him the promised
position, saying, “When you were poor and in a bad way, with no one to support you, you had
pretensions to prophethood. If you attained a governorship and acquired a following, who would be
able to stand you?” In his attempt to bestow upon himself superhuman status, al-Mutanabbi
inadvertently ensured that he would never rise above his station as court poet.   

The coveted governorship was not the only thing al-Mutanabbi’s pride cost him. Many of his
poems reveal that al-Mutanabbi thought of himself as a war hero and fearsome soldier. Just
before his death, this contemptuousness caused him two critical errors. By 965 CE,
al-Mutanabbi gained notoriety among the subjects of his various defamatory satires. Before
traveling to Baghdad from Shiraz, associates warned al-Mutanabbi of a particular avenger,
Fatik, who had vowed to bring al-Mutanabbi to justice. al-Mutanabbi heedlessly rejected the
accompaniment of an escort, no doubt assured that he, his son, and servants were capable of
providing their own protection. Soon after their departure, the group was attacked by Fatik and
friends. It is alleged that al-Mutanabbi was nearly able to flee the scene of slaughter, until a
slave belonging to him called out, “What happened to that verse of yours- ‘The horses and the
night and the barren desert know me/ so too, war and combat and paper and pen’?” Of course,
unable to shake his pride even in a moment of critical peril, al-Mutanabbi returned to the scene
and, outnumbered, met his untimely end.      

Although a span of over 100 years lay between the lives of Abu Nuwas (d. 813) and al-Mutanabbi
(d. 965), they mutually composed at the height of the Islamic Golden Age that ranged from the 8th to
14th centuries. This period marked the beginning of “modern” Arabic poetry, but was still heavily
influenced by pre-Islamic oral tradition. Both poets highly valued the work and tradition of their tribal
poet predecessors. “Modern” poets distinguished their style through the development and elaborate
use of rhetorical devices. Among these devices were conceit, allusion, metaphysics, onomatopoeia,
metaphor, and rhyme that emphasized the novelty of delivery rather than the originality of meaning.
Abbasid era poetry maintained most of the poetic models popularized by pre-Islamic poets, revolving
around recurring topics such as the praise of patrons, hunting, and love.

Abu Nuwas and al-Mutanabbi both were unconventional in their adherence to these models,
but expressed this digression in very different manners. For example, both wrote poems that
began with the commonly cited Bedouin motif, which opens with the scene of an abandoned
campsite once occupied by a lost lover. Al-Mutanabbi’s utilization of this motif appears in the
first ode he authors for his most prestigious patron, the Hamanid overseer of Aleppo,
Sayf al-Dawlah. The poet’s voice is that of the bereft traveler who addresses his companions:

“Your faithfulness is like the abode,

The saddest part of it that which is effaced,

While the most healing of tears are those that flow.

I am aught but a lover and for every lover

The most derelict of his two pure friends is the one who blames him.”

In this introduction, al-Mutanabbi pays tribute to the traditional motif, but adds to the physical
abandonment of his lost lover the additional emotional abandonment of his companions, who fail to
console him. al-Mutanabbi deftly combines the two to convey a doubly potent emotion that
encompasses not only profound loss and regret, but hopelessness that endures longer than the vision of
the campsite, as no one can comprehend his state of forsakenness. In another poem, al-Mutanabbi
again cleverly alters the traditional campsite motif in a novel manner. Instead of depicting a scene of
two consoling companions, the subject instead directs his grief-stricken emotions to the two camel
drivers of his lover’s litter as it is carried away. This technique heightens suspense and emotion as the
subject pleads fruitlessly with the drivers who possess the power to halt their journey and allow him
one last glimpse of his beloved.

Abu Nuwas took a different approach that is truly reflective of his attitude towards convention, and
his personal mantra of living life to the fullest. Rather than reinvent the traditional campsite motif,
Nuwas critically deconstructs it:

“The wretch paused to question an abandoned campsite,

While I paused to question about the neighborhood tavern.

May God never dry the tears of those who cry over stones,

Nor ease the love-pangs of those who yearn for tent pegs.”

His true feelings about the lamentation of lost lovers as a respected theme of Arab poetry is further
clarified in the following line:

“What a difference between those who buy wine and enjoy it,

Versus those who weep over the traces of lost campsites!”

In a quintessentially Abu Nuwas style, the poet offers his favorite vice, wine, as an antidote to the
angst of unsuccessful romantic pursuits. Simultaneously, he mocks those who figuratively wallow
dejectedly in the shadows of loss. He rather encourages the audience to seek out the pleasures of life
because ultimately, the pleasure of wine and the pleasure of love are both temporary.  

These two poems show Abu Nuwas and al-Mutanabbi’s ability to reinvent pre-Islamic structures as a
reflection of their unique, more holistic approaches to composition in a artistic period that was heavily
reliant on tradition. Al-Mutanabbi was expert at adding new polish to old techniques in a manner that
made them fresh and appealing, using minute alterations that cleverly shift the entire setting of the
motif. In contrast, Abu Nuwas constructed novelty presentations of traditional motifs by rebelling
against convention and presenting his own alternatives. The comfort of the repeated motif was
replaced by the pleasure of novel ideas and beliefs.

The styles of Abu Nuwas and al-Mutanabbi do seem to reflect their temperaments. Abu Nuwas’
challenge of poetic tradition is likely influenced by his confrontational and devil-may-care attitude,
more similar to the pagan concept of carpe diem than Islamic conservatism that was also common in
the Islamic Golden Age. Al-Mutanabbi, in contrast, was driven by his pursuit of perfection and
immense creativity, although his compositions also reflect the frustration and disappointment that
resulted from his egotism. Both Arab poets relied greatly on their innate talent, and their flaws of
aggression and pride, that allow their poetry to stand above the rest.    

Bibliography

“Abu Nuwas: The Wretch Paused.” Princeton Online Arabic Poetry. 2018.

Badawi, M.M. “From Primary to Secondary Qaṣīdas: Thoughts on the Development of Classical
Arabic Poetry.”  Journal of Arabic Literature 11 (1980): 1-31.

Fakhreddine, Huda J. “Defining Metapoesis in the Abbasid Age.” Journal of Arabic Literature 42,
No. 2/3 (2011): 205-235.

Kennedy, Philip F. Abu Nuwas: A Genius of Poetry. Makers of the Muslim World. Oneworld
Publications, 2005.

Larkin, Margaret. Al-Mutanabbi: Voice of the ‘Abbasid Poetic Ideal. Makers of the Muslim World.
Oneworld Publications, 2008.

Sanni, Amidu. “The Historic Encounter Between al-Mutanabi and al-Hatimi: Its Contribution to the
Discourse on Ghuluuw (Hyperbole) in Arabic Literary Theory”. Journal of Arabic Literature 35,
No. 2 (2004) :159-174.  

Zwettler, Michael. The Oral Tradition of Classical Arabic Poetry: Its Character and Implications.
Ohio State University Press, 1978.

Hezbollah and Healthcare in Lebanon

"Continuing Tradition: Hezbollah and Healthcare in Lebanon"

by Jessi Donnelly

File: Supporters of Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah wave Hezbollah flags as they listen to him via a screen, Aug. 16, 2013. (REUTERS/Ali Hashisho)

Since October 1997, Hezbollah remains identified by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism as a “foreign terrorist organization.”[1] In the West, that designation represents fear, intolerance, and danger. And yet, Hezbollah provides millions of dollars towards Lebanese social care each year. Though Hezbollah’s funding comes from sources such as drug cartels, nearly 50% of all spending, or $250-500 million dollars are spent yearly on social services including hospitals and healthcare.[2] There is a disparity in the two images of terror and health.

Hezbollah, according to Joseph Alagha in his book Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, has evolved “based on an ideological, social, political, and economical mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab, and Islamic context.”[3] As a deeply rooted Islamic group, though extremist and prone to acts of terror, Hezbollah’s humanitarian work for the people of Lebanon is deeply rooted in the centuries old practice of social service and zakat among Muslims as a part of the larger narrative of Islamic faith. Scholarly discourse on Hezbollah has focused more intently on this complexity overtime, allowing for a more insightful view of the organization’s activities beyond its axiom of terror.

Early scholarly discussions of Hezbollah were intent on analyzing its impact as one of the “few terrorist organizations” to have “global reach.”[4] Daniel Byman, a professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, wrote in 2003 for Foreign Affairs, “Given the organization’s record of bloodshed and hostility, the question is not whether Hezbollah should be stopped; it is how.”[5] Hala Jaber, in The Brown Journal of World Affairs, argued that Hezbollah had become “a synonym for terror.”[6] The consensus was that the radical Islamist group was an immense threat negatively impacting the Lebanese people and would continue to do so until being wiped out by anti-terror forces. However, even just years later, upon further scholarship, the discussion about Hezbollah changed into one focused on understanding the inherent complexities of an organization focused on both militant action and social welfare.

 “Hezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things,” Matthew Levitt explained in his book, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God.[7] Levitt highlighted these different “multiple identities” that Hezbollah assumes, arguing that the organization is “one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and foremost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community.”[8] Levitt’s work focused on Hezbollah’s thirty years of history and in particular, its history of global attacks and acts of terrorism. This perspective was perhaps due to his area of expertise as a terrorist and intelligence expert employed by the government as a counterintelligence advisor.  However, his point that Hezbollah has multiple identities is compelling, despite his focus on their identity as a terrorist organization.

Hezbollah’s history, beginning in the 1980’s, is popularly and not altogether incorrectly understood as one of terrorism, as Levitt suggested. It is understanding the complexity of the group that has gained academic focus in recent scholarship. Augustus Richard Norton’s Hezbollah: A Short History emphasized the evolution of the group over time in his succinct history. Norton, an anthropologist who studied the Middle East for three decades, suggested that it is imperative to understand Hezbollah from several perspectives. Understanding should come from the individual level of popular support from Shi’i Muslims in Lebanon, and also at the transnational level where the organization can be viewed as one of political force and militant action.[9] By looking at the history of Hezbollah from these sometimes counterintuitive perspectives, Norton argued, the complex placement of the organization is made clear and becomes more than “the greatest guerilla group in the world.”[10]

 In reality, the organization also serves as a social service organization for Lebanon. As Brian R. Early argued in his article, “Larger than a Party, Yet Smaller than a State,” Hezbollah is also “Lebanon’s largest non-state provider of healthcare and social services” and shouldn’t be simply dismissed as simply a terrorist organization.[11] Early’s work emphasized the alternative identities that Levitt’s work mentioned, and discussed the importance of Hezbollah’s relationship with the Lebanese state. Further, Early contended that Hezbollah has intentionally worked to assume the identity of an “Islamic welfare state” and used millions of dollars of funds provided by Iran to ensure a “complete social welfare system within the Shi’ite communities” within Lebanon.[12] This alternate identity, one of social service, seems oppositional to that of a terrorist identity, and yet, the proof is undeniable that Hezbollah is more than simply a group of extreme terrorists.

In a somewhat drastic shift from her earlier argument, Hala Jaber’s later work, Hezbollah, highlighted the programs created by Hezbollah’s Health Committee including hospitals and schools. As Jaber noted, Lebanon lacks state welfare programs and almost all citizens lack medical insurance.[13] To meet this social need, the Health Committee “opened more than forty health centers and clinics in South Beruit, Lebanon” and other health centers throughout the country since the 1980’s.[14] Jaber’s book, written towards a general audience and based on interviews conducted with Hezbollah leadership, argued that Hezbollah is intentionally shifting to be seen as more moderate and less extremist. Joseph Alagha also argued that Hezbollah shifted ideological focus to that of a “pragmatic political focus.”[15]

In his work, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program, Alagha posited that Hezbollah began with a radical religious identity, but over time has intentionally transformed its ideology from rigorously Islamic exclusivism to a more compromising liberal stance as it began program of “enrollment in Lebanese domestic political life.”[16] Despite or perhaps because of this shift, Alagha pointed out that Hezbollah considers an important aspect of “its religious task” to be the necessity of “providing medical care and hospitalization.”[17] The religious ideology behind Hezbollah’s updated methods of engaging in zakat (through creation of healthcare) no less complicated than their position. While the social welfare work is religiously based, it also serves as a legitimizing point that Hezbollah is more than a destructive force. Further, as Alagha pointed out, it also maintains their past legitimacy as an Islamic group while they shift their ideology from radical to increasingly liberal.[18]

As these realizations about Hezbollah’s shifting nature materialized, the discussion about Hezbollah changed. It was no longer enough to label Hezbollah as simply an organization of extreme terror. Rather, voices in the conversation began to question Hezbollah’s identity as a legitimate political organization. The conversation became even more interesting when prominent voices from within Hezbollah itself contributed monographs for consideration. In Hizbullah: The Story from Within, Naim Qassem asserted that Hezbollah should be seen as legitimate and as “primarily” an Islamic political party and further, as a “moderate” social movement in Lebanon, rather than a terrorist organization.[19] Further, he contended it must be understood “the Party’s practical path is interconnected with the principles of the faith it carries.”[20]

These statements, perhaps somewhat outlandish in light of previous scholarship, make more sense when it is made clear that Naim Qassem is a Shi’i scholar and politician from Lebanon. He is also second in command of Hezbollah as it’s acting secretary general. The importance of Qassem’s work however, rests in its international publication and wide consideration as a book offering “exceptional insight into the principles, objectives, and worldview” by academic reviewers.[21] With inside voices such as Qassem contributing to the legitimate conversation regarding Hezbollah, it was perhaps impossible to consider the discourse anything but complex. It seemed acceptable to consider Hezbollah’s non-military actions as a genuine reason to not dismiss its other identities.

One aspect of scholarly discussion focused on how Lebanon and its people responded to the increasingly complex multiple identities of Hezbollah. Kevin Simon, in “Hezbollah: Terror in Context,” found that as much as 38% of Lebanon considered Hezbollah favorably and to be a moderate political party.[22] Further, Simon argued that the specific reason Hezbollah is so popular is due to its “very successful implementation of social services.”[23] By spending upwards of 50% of its funds, gained legitimately through zakat donations or illicitly from drug trades, Hezbollah has become “indispensable” to the Lebanese people.[24] The focus was no longer on Hezbollah’s identity as a terrorist organization, but rather as its identity as a provider of healthcare, social programs, and welfare as a complex, political organization.

Shawn Flannigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad continued this focus in their article, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations.” Flannigan and Abdel-Samad also claimed that Hezbollah’s popularity within Lebanon stemmed directly from its social services and health support. Further, they argued that the motivating factor of these provided services was based on “social jihad” that was “integral to Hezbollah’s struggle against Israel and the West” which had been one of the organization’s founding ideologies.[25] Further, like the earlier sentiments of Alagha and Haber, Flannigan and Abdel-Samad agreed that Hezbollah intentionally used their healthcare and social programs to increase their political legitimacy. They suggested, “Hezbollah’s health and social services primarily benefit Lebanon’s Shi’ite population and are typically not advertised to the Lebanese population at large except following an Israeli attack.”[26] While the zakat is fundamental to Hezbollah, its successful politicizing of welfare programs indicates a highly complex nature, previously unearthed by scholarly analysis.

Hezbollah and its connection to healthcare in Lebanon had morphed into its own topic of discourse in the academic world. James B. Love, in his work, “Hezbollah: A Charitable Revolution,” argued that the social service and healthcare programs of Hezbollah are a driving force behind its success.[27] According to Love, in accordance with both Haber and Alagha, this was a strategic move by the organization to meet both its religious and political ideological needs. Love stated, “Hezbollah established a solid popular support base by leveraging the needs and injustices of the Lebanese Shi’a.”[28]

In addition, and most importantly to the academic discourse concerning Hezbollah, Love connected this strategic move to the Islamic institution of zakat, noting that it is both a means of legitimizing the organization and as a possible means of funding.[29] In addition to adhering to the third pillar of Islam, Hezbollah has created social welfare programs to receive additional funding from Muslims. This funding can then be funneled back into healthcare or perhaps into other activities. Love concluded his work with a warning that the danger of Hezbollah is that its “model” could be perpetuated by further jihadi movements and “unique, proven, and exportable.”[30] Hezbollah’s legacy as a terrorist organization may very well take on new meaning for future discourse if Love’s premonition is correct.

The history of Hezbollah is indeed one of terrorist acts and militant Islam. Its ideological basis as a religious organization however, evolved into multiple identities, as Levitt suggested. However, the initial analysis that Hezbollah was nothing more than a radically dangerous Islamic organization focused on terror dismissed its complexity. Scholarly discourse, which had at first simply focused on the threat of Hezbollah as organization with a global reach as the “A-team of terror” left much of the organization’s outreach unanalyzed. Yet, relatively quickly, the academic world shifted its discussion from security and Hezbollah as terror to one of prominent social service. The dichotomy of terror and health was one worth exploring and the complexity of the situation was, and continues to be, one of legitimate scholarship.

The importance of understanding Hezbollah’s multiple identities cannot be understated. It will never fully be free of its terrorist mantle and more importantly, that history should not be forgotten. Yet, Hezbollah is also the force that provides healthcare to 500,000 Lebanese.[31] The intention behind that healthcare provision is both religious, as a means to engage in zakat, the third pillar of Islam, and also political as a means to “increase its popularity and prove its competence while simultaneously highlighting the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese government.”[32] It is both charitable and intentionally political. By understanding the complexity of Hezbollah and its social, political, and military identities within Lebanon and worldwide, scholars will further provide further illumination into the popularity of these organizations. Particularly in the West, it is imperative to understand the motivations and intertwined religiously political nature of “state-less governments” such as Hezbollah. 

Bibliography

Alagha, Joseph. Hizbullah’s Identity Construction. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011.

Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006.

Byman, Daniel. "Should Hezbollah Be Next?" Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 54-66.

Early, Brian R. “’Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State’: Locating Hezbollah’s Place Within Lebanon’s State and Society,” World Affairs 168, no. 3 (2006): 115.

Flanigan, Shawn T. and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad.” Middle East Policy 16, no. 2 (2009): 112-137.

Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with a Vengance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Jaber, Hala. "Consequences of Imperialism: Hezbollah and the West." The Brown Journal of World Affairs 6, no. 1 (1999): 163-76.

Levitt, Matthew. Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006.

Love, James B. Hezbollah: A Charitable Revolution. Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008. http://www.soc.mil/Swcs/SWEG/AY_2008/Love,%20J%202008.pdf

Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Salwen, Sarah. Journal of Church and State 48, no. 4 (2006): 884-85. http://www.jstor.org.libpublic3.library.isu.edu/stable/23921491.

Simon, Kevin, "Hezbollah: Terror in Context." 2012 AHS Capstone Projects. Paper 18. 2012.

http://digitalcommons.olin.edu/ahs_capstone_2012/18

U.S. State Department. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. 2016. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

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[1] U.S. State Department, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2016. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

[2] Kevin Simon, "Hezbollah: Terror in Context,” 2012 AHS Capstone Projects, Paper 18, 2012,

http://digitalcommons.olin.edu/ahs_capstone_2012/18.

[3]  Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 19.

[4] Daniel Byman, "Should Hezbollah Be Next?" Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 54.

[5] Byman, 55.

[6] Hala Jaber, "Consequences of Imperialism: Hezbollah and the West," The Brown Journal of World Affairs 6, no. 1 (1999): 163-76.

[7] Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 8.

[8] Levitt, 8.

[9] Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 4-6.

[10] Norton, 140.

[11] Brian R. Early, “’Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State’: Locating Hezbollah’s Place Within Lebanon’s State and Society,” World Affairs 168, no. 3 (2006): 115.

[12] Early, 120.

[13] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 158.

[14] Jaber, 158-162.

[15] Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 13.

[16] Alagha, 15.

[17] Alagha, 241.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Naim Qassem, Hizbollah: The Story from Within, trans. Dalia Khahil (London: Saqi Press, 2010).

[20] Qassem, 6.

[21] Sarah Salwen, Journal of Church and State 48, no. 4 (2006): 884. http://www.jstor.org.libpublic3.library.isu.edu/stable/23921491.

[22] Kevin, Simon. "Hezbollah: Terror in Context," 2012 AHS Capstone Projects, Paper 18, 2012, 3.

http://digitalcommons.olin.edu/ahs_capstone_2012/18

[23] Simon, 6.

[24] Simon, 7.

[25] Shawn T. Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” Middle East Policy 16, no. 2 (2009): 112-13.

[26] Flanigan and Abdel Samad, 114.

[27] James B. Love, Hezbollah: A Charitable Revolution (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 3.

[28] Love, iii.

[29] Love, 95.

[30] Love, iii.

[31] Simon, 4.

[32] Flanigan and Abdel Samad, 114.