The Taliban (1994-2001)

History

Before the Taliban ever existed, Afghanistan practiced a conservative form of Islam. However this form was very tolerant due to a popularity of Sufism (a mystical branch of Islam) in the area.1 Until 1992, Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews lived in the region, being a major part of the bazaar economy in the country.2 Once the Cold War began, that all changed.

Soviets and the British leered at Afghanistan with hungry eyes. The country is a crossroad between Iran, Central Asia, the Arabian Sea and India.3 Getting this land would allow a way to bypass the violence going on in revolutionary Iran. In 1979, the Russian Soviets invaded. The Afghani’s declared jihad against their invaders.

  These jihadist fighters were called the mujahideen. Led by the Pashtun, the ethnic group that lived on the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the mujahideen fought against the Soviets for ten years, practicing guerrilla warfare. America and Pakistan backed the fighters. The CIA supplied them with money, training, medical aid, and weaponry to destroy the Red menace, with the hopes of bypassing oil around Iran. 

In 1988, the Soviets withdrew. And by year later, so did the Americans, leaving Afghanistan devastated after the ten year engagement.4 With no stable government, civil war broke out. The mujahideen fought for power, pushing the Pashtun population to the south and east against the ethnic minorities to the north. The minorities of the north called themselves the Northern Alliance.5

A student led organization rose from the madrasahs (seminaries) within Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.6 Led by Mullah Umar, the primarily Pashtun student (taliban) group promised peace, order and law in the war weary country. This promise made the community quickly accept the organization, it becoming popular and was very successful. The Taliban at first had no urge to run the country, until 1996, when they captured the capital, Kabul.7 Assisted by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supporters hoping for political gain, the Taliban took over Afghanistan.

Illegal activity funded the Taliban, bringing the organization immense wealth. One of the Taliban’s major assets is opium. Afghanistan is the world’s largest heroin producer in the world. In 1999, the country produced 46,000 metric tons of opium, ninety-six percent of it belonging to the Taliban.8 Drug dealers operate the only banking system in the country and rural farmers were given credit in advance for their opium crop.9

Smuggling is another huge money maker for the extremist group. The smuggling between Afghanistan and Pakistan has become a multimillion dollar operation. Due to local factories who are unable to compete with the smugglers, the local economy is a disaster.10 To make matters worse, the government had turned a blind eye to the criminal activity, the government wanting a cut of the money gained from the prohibited acts. 

The Taliban ruled over Afghanistan for nearly seven years. In 1999, the repressive government started to loose it’s handle over the country. The Northern Alliance began to fight back, capturing Taliban territory and pushing towards Kabul. The Pashtun youth no longer volunteered to join and fighters started to return home.11 People within the Taliban itself questioned their leader’s motives. With huge amounts of wealth coming in through their illegal smuggling and opium, supporters started to believe that the Taliban had lost its spirituality in favor for personal and financial gain.12

2001 marked the end of the Taliban. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan, taking the group out of power. In their place, the U.S. positioned Hamid Kazari. During the Soviet War, Kazari worked as an advisor and diplomat for the mujahideen. Offered a job with the Taliban, Kazari refused when the fundamentalist organization presumably gunned down his father. As a result,  Kazari worked against the Taliban with the Northern Alliance.13 Working along side Americans in 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom, Kazari and his allies helped  take the Taliban out of power.14 In 2002, Kazari became the president of Afghanistan and is still currently in office.

Ideology

The philosophy of the Taliban comes from a fundamentalist branch of Islam known as Deobandism. This branch grew out of British India as a reform movement against the colonial invaders.15 Originally, Deobandism wanted to bring back classical text but apply them to modern times. The Taliban ignores this. The Deobandi ideas were taught at Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan during the Soviet invasion, it being very popular in the country.

The Pakistani Deobandis set up a political party with strong anti-American beliefs called Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The JUI setup madrasahs, funded by Saudi Arabia, around the Pushtan belt of Pakistan. They  offered Afghan refugees free education, food, shelter, and military training.16 However, these seminary school were being taught by mullahs with no real knowledge of Deobandism. Because the schools were funded by Saudis, the beliefs taught within them were more Wahhabism based.

Focusing around morality, war, and commerce , the Taliban created their own version of  Deobandism. It has a very strict moral code, there even being a Vice and Virtue Police. This secret police force goes around and makes sure that every one is dressed, speaks, and acts morally good. There is a ban on art, there being no radio, photos or television. As a result of this people didn’t know who their leaders even looked like.17 Men are required to grow beards and daily prayers are enforced.

Taliban and Women

Out of all the people who have suffered from the Taliban, Afghan women have suffered the most. On December 6, 1996, the Vice and Virtue police said they had punished ( this involving beating, raping, torture, or murder) 225 women for violating clothing rules.18

In order to keep lust out of men’s mind, women are forced to wear the burqa. This garment is a head to toe veil that contains a small mesh hole for the woman to see.19 Cosmetics and brightly colored clothing are not allowed. Women may not wear high heeled shoes, or any shoe that makes a noise. Some woman who have painted their finger nails have had their fingers cut off.20

To continue the extremes enforced on women, Afghan women may not go to school or work. Women may not laugh or speak loudly. Windows must be painted over so that no one may see a woman within it. They may not be treated by a male doctor. Women may not gather in any public gathering or festivity. If going out in public, women must be escorted by a mahram (close male relative). Even a place that gives reference to women in their name, the name must be changed.21   Sadly, it used to not be like this.

During the reign of  King Amanullah (1919-1929) women were close equals to men. He feared that his country would become out of date if he did not accept Western ideas.22 As a result, he created many reforms for women. Child marriages were banned and polygamy was outlawed. Women even had a choice to not wear the veil. In 1978, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan pushed for making it mandatory for women to get an education.23 Women had a place in the work force. But after the Soviet war, and the Taliban took over, this all ended. 

Even though the Taliban was removed from government in 2001, Taliban groups arose from the Pakistan mountains after the Americans of Operation Enduring Freedom left for Iraq.24 Though not as strong as before, the Taliban still has a grasp around Afghanistan. The group uses their wealth and terrain to support other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. 

Women have seen little change in their deadly repression, even today. The nearly 400 women in prison, for “moral crimes” that include running away from an abusive home or for having sex outside of marriage due to forced prostitution.25 A report from Oxfam in 2011 informs that eighty-seven percent of women experienced physical, sexual, or psychological abuse or forced marriage.26 If you would like to help the women of Afghanistan, visit the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan’s (RAWA) website at rawa.org (does contain graphic content).

End Notes
1. Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism” Foreign Affairs Vol.78, No.6 (1999): 24.

2. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”, 24.

3. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  24.

4. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  23.

5. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  23.

6. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  24.

7. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”, 24.

8. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  33.

9. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  33.

10. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”, 34.

11. Peter Tomsen, “A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: the Taliban’s Days are Numbered,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, No.1 (2000): 180.

12. Tomsen, “Taliban’s Days are Numbered,” 180.

13. “Hamid Kazari Biography,” last modified November 2009,  http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/kar0bio-1.

14. “The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom,” last modified March 2006, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm.

15. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  26.

16. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  26.

17. Rashid, “Exporting Extremism”,  24.

18. Mary Ann Franks, “Obscene Undersides: Women and Evil Between the Taliban and                          the United States,” Hypatia Vol. 18 No.1 (2003): 140.  

19. Joanne Stato and Karla Mantilla, “Afghan Women Protest Taliban in Washington,“ Off our Backs: A Women’s News Journal Vol. 31 No. 4 (2001): 1.

20. Franks, “Obscene Undersides,” 140.

21. Franks, “Obscene Undersides,” 139-140.

22. Franks, “Obscene Undersides,” 138.

23. Franks, “Obscene Undersides,” 139.

24. “Hamid Kazari Biography”.

25. “Afghanistan: the Quagmire of US Occupation,” Nicole Colson, last modified April 2012, http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2012/04/11/afghanistan-the-quagmire-of-u-s-occupation.html.

26. “Afghanistan: the Quagmire of US Occupation”.

Bibliography

Academy of Achievement. “Hamid Kazari Biography.” Last modified November 2009,   http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/kar0bio-1.

Franks, Mary Anne. “Obscene Undersides: Women and Evil Between the Taliban and                           the United States.” Hypatia Vol. 18 No.1 (2003):135-156 .  

Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 78, No.6 (1999): 25-25.

Revolutionary Association of the Rights of the Women of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan: the Quagmire of US Occupation.” Nicole Colson. Last modified April 2012. http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2012/04/11/afghanistan-the-quagmire-of-u-s- occupation.html.


Stato and Mantilla. “Afghan Women Protest Taliban in Washington.“ Off our Backs: A Women’s News Journal Vol. 31 No. 4 (2001): 1

Tomsen, Peter. “A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: the Taliban’s Days are Numbered.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, No.1 (2000): 179-182.

U.S. Army Center of Military History. “The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom.” Last modified March 2006. http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20F reedom.htm.

Hezbollah



 Figure 1: Hezbollah flag. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah



                                                                        

In 1990, with the fifteen year Lebanese civil war coming to an end the fractured country began the process of putting itself back together.  Seizing this unique opportunity, Hezbollah, one of the most successful terrorist organizations of the 1980s, developed a political wing and won seats in the 1992 and 1994 Lebanese parliamentary elections.[1]  Hezbollah was able to do this with a combination of financial backing from Shi’a states and the political capital it had built via its resistance to the Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon. While these elections gave Hezbollah a legitimate face on the international stage, it did little to curtail their violent actions. This essay constitutes a brief overview of the formation and rise to power of “the most technically-capable terrorist group in the world and a continued security threat to the United States”[2]

Hezbollah formed in 1982 in Southern Lebanon, as a response to Israeli entrenchment in the area. Israel had invaded Southern Lebanon in an effort to combat Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) elements that had established a base in the area. The Sunni PLO were not welcome in this Shi’a area and clashes often happened. Such was the extent of these clashes that when the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) carried out its assault on the PLO many “Shia greeted [them] as liberators”.[3] However, this approval of Israeli military action did not sit well with all Lebanese Shia, The most notable exception being Muhammad Hussein Fadallah (1935-2010) a staunch anti-Israeli Shi’a cleric. The primary Shi’a group in Lebanon in the early eighties was Amal, which did not wish to contend with Israeli’s military might and thus sought a political resolution to the conflict. Fadallah “exhorted he significant number of disaffected Islamists affiliated to Amal to remain in the movement and seek to transform it from within”.[4] Many of these discontents made their way to the city of Baalbek, where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) had commanded deployed a unit of his Islamic Revolutionary Guard.

It is important to note that at this time the Iran-Iraq war was in full swing. Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) had constructed one of the most technologically advanced armies in the Arab world. To counter this, Khomeini exhorted his army (and its civilian conscripts) into ecclesiastical fury establishing a “cult of martyrdom”.[5] This notion of self-sacrifice would be disseminated through the military officers training the Lebanese as well as various Shia clerics. It is unknown to what extent this led Hezbollah to innovate the use of suicide attacks, but at the very least it helped legitimize those attacks within the eyes of Muslims.

It is from this confluence of factors that Hezbollah formed. It believed, and the clerics preached, that they were operating to create an ideal Islamic state in Lebanon. They also steadfastly claim that Hezbollah is a nation movement and not an organization in the traditional sense. This is very important as it allowed the Shia clerics and Hezbollah’s Syrian and Iranian financers to have enough distance between them and any attack carried out that it is nearly impossible to not only trace to them much less justify retaliation against them directly.

  

Figure 2:  US Marine Barracks post bombing. http://www.historycommons.org/topic.jsp?topic=country_lebanon

                     

Shortly after its founding Hezbollah would have a major impact with attacks against Israeli military and intelligence targets as well as the “highly effective October 1983 suicide attacks against the U.S. and French contingents of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut”.[6] In reaction to these attacks and the kidnapping of foreign nationals, both the United States and the French withdrew their forces from Lebanon.  This was a major coup for Hezbollah, as it had done what no other Islamist organization had been able to do, drive out the United States. The implications of which would pay huge dividends in allowing Hezbollah to span the Sunni Shia split garnering them more support, and manpower in their continued campaign against the Israelis.  

Hezbollah was not, however, able to achieve a true polity at this time.  1986 would see them join with the PLO against Amal in the War of the Camps. This conflict with Amal would continue, on and off until 1988, although it would be 1991 before a true accord between the two was reached.  This conflict continued despite the appeals of Fadallah for peace. This illustrates that while Fadallah was undoubtedly an important inspirational figure to Hezbollah he was not in any sense a factional leader. Hezbollah also proved it was willing to engage in armed conflict with Syrian forces highlighting that although Fadallah and Syria both were important in Hezbollah’s organization and funding Iran was the true power behind it.

Aside from the successful blows stricken against Israeli and there US allies Hezbollah also “has a vast network of foundations and charities that expand its reach throughout Lebanon”.[7] Through this network, Hezbollah is able to garner support amongst members of the population turned off by their violence.  By providing humanitarian support for the segments of society most impacted by the Israeli reprisals, Hezbollah is creating a steady line of voters, and recruits, for their cause.

Although the 1990s say the end of both the Iran-Iraq war and the Lebanese civil war along with the above-mentioned constitution of Hezbollah as a political party, the 90s saw an increase in the violence towards Israel. When their leader, Secretary General Sayyid Abbas Masawi (1952-1992) along with his family were killed in an Israeli strike the violence would reach beyond the Middle East. Hezbollah responded by bombing two Israeli targets in Argentina, the Israeli embassy in 1992 and the Jewish Cultural Center two years later. As Hezbollah became entwined with the Lebanese government, it also expanded beyond being a simple terrorist group. It was able to spread its religious-political message through its own TV station, it transformed from “rag-tag military organization . . . to a mini-Israeli army”.[8] Eventually the cost of staying in Lebanon became too high, and Israel withdrew its forces in 2000.  Hezbollah immediately declared a victory over Israeli. To date it is the only Islamic entity, terrorist group or state, which has such a claim. Add to that its previous success in driving out the MNF and its willingness to mix it up with other Islamic groups one sees their reputation for viciousness and success is well deserved.

Hezbollah now sits in a position of power within the Middle East. Its past successes have given it an impressive pedigree amongst all Islamic extremists. Since the 2000 withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, Hezbollah has continued to support and organize terrorist movements within Israel and occasionally launches raids or rocket attacks across the border. However, its position as one of Lebanon’s premiere political parties has allowed it, much like the PLO, to avoid the label of terrorist organizations by many members of the international community. Exactly how Hezbollah chooses to use its political capital and what, if any role it will take in the political restructuring of those Islamic nations affected by the revolutions of the Arab Spring.  

Bibliography

Byman, Daniel. A high Price: The Triumphs & Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. New York:
     Oxford University Press, 2011.

 Feltman, Jeffrey D, and Daniel Benjamin. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "U.S. Department of
    State." Last modified June, 08 2010. Accessed April 28, 2012.
     http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/142857.htm

Kramer, Martin. The Moral Logic of Hizballah. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies,
     Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
     Center Press, 2011.

Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W. W.
     Norton & Company, 2007.

 Sankari, Jamal. Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi'ite Leader. London: SAQI, 2005.

[1]   Although there are several alternate spellings of the name Hezbollah, I have decided to go with this, more familiar westernized version. Jamal Sankari, Fadlallah: the Making of a Radical Shi'ite Leader, (London: SAQI, 2005).

[2]   Feltman, Jeffrey D, and Daniel Benjamin. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "U.S. Department of State." Last modified June, 08 2010. Accessed April 28, 2012. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/142857.htm

[3]   Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). P. 114.

[4]   Jamal Sankari, Fadlallah: the Making of a Radical Shi'ite Leader, (London: SAQI, 2005). P. 197

[5]   Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). P. 133.

[6]   Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah," chap. 8 in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).p. 141

[7]   Daniel Byman, A high Price: The Triumphs & Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). P 230.

[8]   Ibid p. 225.

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Qadiriyyah Tariqah (oldest tariqah in W. Africa)

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11^th 2001, the Islamic faith has had a negative connotation attached to it in the United States. Many people do not have any understanding of the religion beyond what the talking heads espouse from their television sets. To them Islam is a monolithic religion, while they may have heard terms like Shi’a and Sunni, they often fail to recognize them as different denominations. This blog post is part of a series that wishes to change all that. Each post will focus on one aspect of this multi-faceted religion giving a brief overview of its history, key figures, and other factors that make it unique.

                The images of a whirling dervish or flowing Islamic poetry are what immediately comes to western minds when Sufism is mentioned. However, the mystic traditions associated with the Sufi have created many tariqahs, or devotional paths, that spring from individual teachers. One of the oldest and most widespread of these paths is that of the Qadiriyya.

History

The founder of the Qadiriyya, ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077/8-1166 CE), had no intention of founding a tariqah. A man of Persian decent he immigrated to Baghdad at the age of eighteen where various religious scholars instructed him. His primary instruction was in Hanbalite religious law his instructor was,   Abu Sa’id b.  ‘ali al-Muharrami (d. 1119); al-Qadir’s ascension as a religious leader was cemented in 1133 when he was named a Shaykh of the madrasa that al-Muharrami had founded, a position he held until his death in 1166.[i]  Although al-Qadir is considered the founder of the Qadiriyya tariqah, the movement truly did not develop until after his death.  Al-Qadir’s son, ‘Abd al-Razzaq (d. 1206/7), carefully constructed his father’s legacy in the way he compiled and released his writings. Some claim al-Razzaq authored certain poems to legitimize his claims about his father.[ii] “saying that his father was descended on his father’s side from Hasan, the older son of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima (605-633 CE), and on his mother’s side from her younger son Husayn (626-680 CE). For each of these assertions he provides a corresponding genealogy.”[iii] Abd al-Razzaq then goes on to say that, his father was also related, through one of his paternal or maternal grandparents, to all four of the venerated Rightly Guided Caliphs.  According to ‘Abd al-Razzaq, the first holder of the post of [pole] was none other than the Prophet Muhammad (570-630 CE) himself. This rank passed after the Prophet’s death to his cousin, the fourth caliph ‘Ali (600-661 CE), and was inherited from him in succession by poles who each invested his trusted disciple with it. ‘Abd al-Qadir was invested with the rank of [pole] by Abu Sa’id b. ‘Ali al-Makhzumi, who held it before him in this continuous chain of succession. “[iv] This gave the Qadiriyya a religious legitimacy against their Abbasid rivals in Baghdad caliphate.

When the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258 al-Qadir’s madrasa was left untouched. Perhaps the sparing of this site inspired the 13^th Century writings of Nur al-Din ‘Ali al-Shattanufi (1246/7-1314 CE) a  teacher at al-Azhar university-mosque in Cairo. He “consolidated the legend of ‘Abd al-Qadir as the holder of the highest authority among the awliya’ and the Prophet’s deputy in the religious guidance of the Muslim community in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the caliphate.  .  .  His legend thus alleviated the great religious uncertainties this cataclysmic event caused to Muslims, and accorded with the nostalgic sentiments Baghdad evoked in the Muslims after the collapse of the caliphate.”[v]  When the Ottoman Turks conquered the area centuries later in 1534 sultan Sulayman (1494-1566 CE) had a dome placed on al-Qadir’s tomb thereby, “he signaled the recognition . . . of the Qadiriyya tariqah as his main Sunnite allies in Iraq in the confrontation with the Safawid Shi’ites.”[vi]

The legitimacy the Qadiriyya thus firmly established it began to migrate throughout the Muslim world. It proliferated across Northern Africa, Afghanistan, and China. Part of this tariqahs appeal is that al-Qadir never established a set way for religious ceremonies to be conducted. This allowed local religious leaders to adopt current practice into the venerated lineage of Qadiriyya. From here, we will look at the influx and influence of the tariqah in the areas previously mentioned.

Africa

                Qadiriyya  made its way into Northern African primarily along the trade routes that crisscrossed the continent from an Egyptian home base.  In West Africa, the tariqah found a powerful patron in the person of Mukhtar al-Kunti (1728-1811 CE). His adoption of the belief system, and his families influence combined to provide a climate that allowed Qadiriyya to flourish in the early 18^th Century. The Kunti line continued to spread the faith even after Mukhtar’s death. His son Ahmad al-Bakka’I al-Kunta (1803-1865 CE), and his followers, were “active in many parts of West Africa and [were] tied to the forces of revival. There were Qadiriyya centers [throughout West Africa] with at least some ties to the Kunti leaders in Futa Jallom, Futa Toro”[vii]

                When French forces pushed into Algeria in the 19^th Century they found not only a culture more advanced than they had expected but also a foe that would bedevil them for decades to come, namely Abd al-Qadir (1807-1817 CE). Al-Qadir was both a religious and a political leader who would attempt to combine the Berbers and the Turks into a single polity to resist French encroachment, “al-Qadir soon established a militant movement that was both an army and a state.”[viii] Although he managed successfully to fight the French for twenty years, he eventually succumbed to their technical superiority as well as internal conflicts with other Muslim leaders: such as Mustafa b. Isma’il (1769-1843 CE) who clashed politically and militarily with al-Qadir throughout the 1830s.

China

                The Qadiriyya in China created not only a religious community but also a sub sect of Chinese who consider themselves ethnically Muslim yet do not practice the Islamic faith, the Hui. The tariqah entered into China in the late 17^th Century.   When the travels of Khoja Abd Alla (1616-1690 CE) took him to the orient, “a twenty-ninth-generation descendent of Muhammad . . . records show he entered China in 1674 and preached in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Linxia, Gansu, and was finally buried in Guizhou in 1689.”[ix] A worship center has since sprung up around Abd Alla’s tomb, and continues to this day.  

Conclusion

                The combination of religious legitimacy and flexibility has enabled the Qadiriyya Tariqah to span across several continents and provide a sense of identity for people of a variety of backgrounds. Beyond the spiritual applications, this movement has provided a unifying force in times of political upheaval.  Its ability to change with the times should see it to continue to grow and expand in the years to come.

Bibliography

Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. Muslim Communities of Grace The Sufi Brotherhoods in Islamic Religious
     Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Gladney, Dru C. "Muslim Tombs and Ethnic Folklore: Charters for Hui Identity." The Journal of
     Asian Studies. 46. no. 3 (1987): 495-532.

Voll, John Obert. Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World second editin. Syracuse,
     New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994.

---

[i] Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, Muslim Communities of Grace The Sufi Brotherhoods in Islamic Religious Life, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 87

[ii] ibid

[iii] Ibid

[iv] ibid

[v] ibid

[vi] ibid

[vii] John Obert Voll, Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World second edition, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994).77

[viii] ibid

[ix] Dru C. Gladney, “Muslim Tombs and Ethnic Folklore: Charters for Hui Identity,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 46, no. 3 (1987): 495-532, 503http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=5153458425548010520#editor/target=post;postID=5413576007369249445

The Baath Party, Rise of Saddam Hussein, and the Iran-Iraq War

The Baath Party started as proponent of Arab Socialism that had come to the forefront by Nasser in Egypt. In 1968 the Baath party successfully overthrew the monarchy in Iraq. With control over the country, the party used their influence to control Iraq in two distinct areas; one with party members at high government positions and military personnel. The other was influencing party decisions at the local levels.  Due to the system that was established under the Baath Party this allowed for Saddam Hussein to take control, manipulate his people, and launch the most destructive war of the late 20^th century.

Governmental and Political Structure of the Republic of Iraq:

The Baath Party became the dominant political party of Iraq following the coup of the monarchy in 1968. From here in theory Iraq was to be a republic of party politics. In practice the country became dominated by the Baath Party and this heavily influenced the political decisions of the government.[1]

At the local party level, the party introduced cells of three to seven members in each village to be the eyes and ears of the party. These village members would report their findings to the provincial level.[2] The provincial level had twenty-one branches, eighteen for each province and three branches for the capital of Baghdad. The union of the provincial level created the party's congress from which elected the regional command. The regional command at its head was the secretary general, who was the head of the Baath Party, and the deputy secretary general, who was second in rank. The regional command had the authority to be the top decision making body for the party. In theory, the regional command was answerable to the party congress and would convene with them over policies.[3]

At the national level was the National Command. This group had representatives from all regional commands and answered to the National Congress, it led the direction of the National Baath Party. The National Command operated as the spokes group for the Baath Movement to the outside world.[4]

In July 1968, the Revolutionary Command Council was established as the decision making body for the state of Iraq. In theory it differed slightly from the Baath Party structure, but in reality the secretary general of the Baath Party was the head of the Revolutionary Command Council. In 1977, the Baath Party regarded all members of the Party Command as members of the Revolutionary Command Council, essentially legitimizing the Baath Party as the only party of the state.[5]

Saddam Hussein's Rise to Power:

In the wake of the coup of the monarchy in Iraq in 1968, the Baath Party emerged as the dominant political group in Iraq. After Nasser's control of the Arab Socialist movement waned following the defeat in the June 1967 War, this allowed the Baath Party to move more freely. By 1968 the Baath Party created an inner circle of tribal ties to lead the party. The most notable tribe was the Tikriti, a Sunni group from the northwestern town of Tikrit. In the first Revolutionary Command Council, three of the five members were Tikritis, one of them being Saddam Hussein.[6]

The leader of Iraq following the coup in 1968 was Ahmad Hasa al Bakr. After an unsuccessful coup attempt by a coalition of conservatives and military personnel less than two months into Bakr's regime, he utilized this distraction to launch numerous purges against his enemies. From 1968 to 1973 he orchestrated sham trials, executions, assassinations, and intimidations to eliminate anyone suspected of challenging the Baath Party or his rule.[7]

With Bakr as the head of the party, Hussein maintained his position as the second in command. Both men worked together to form strong bonds with the military which included Baathists and non-Baathists. Hssein became known as a ruthless politician, maneuvering himself to prevent political opponents from emerging. In 1969, Hussein became the moving force for the party, while keeping Bakr in a more figurehead type role.[8]

In 1973, after an unsuccessful coup attempt, the Revolutionary Command Council amended the constitution giving the president more powers. By 1977 the Baath Party was being exclusively led by Bakr, Hussein, and General Adnan Khayer Allah Talfah, Hussein's brother-in-law.[9] Also in 1977, due to Bakr's failing health, he started to rely much more heavily on Hussein. Nearly all parts of the government and the Baath Party reported directly to Hussein instead of Bakr. The following year, the Baath Party created its own militia of 50,000 men. Bakr officially resigned his post as the president in 1979. This made Hussein the president of the republic, secretary general of the Baath Party, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and commander in chief of the armed forces. [10]

One of Hussein’s major goals for the country was to strengthen the economy.  He introduced state sponsored industrial modernization programs that created much popularity within the Iraqi people.  He provided a greater distribution of wealth, greater social mobility, an increased access to education and health care, and the redistribution of land.  These programs brought great numbers of Iraqis to the Baath Party, including many that had been strongly opposed to the central government.[11] 

            After the consolidation of power by the Baath Party, they pursued their goal of spreading their Pan-Arabic and Socialist philosophy across the Arab states.  Between 1975 and 1979, Hussein worked with the Shah of Iran to help ease long standing tensions that had been around since the end of World War II.  Hussein reached out to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other Gulf kingdoms. 

            One of the most important diplomatic opportunities that arose for Hussein was the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978.  When Egypt under the leadership of President Anwar Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel, this move alienated Egypt from the rest of the Arab world.  This allowed Hussein and Iraq to play a larger role in Arab affairs.  He denounced the Camp David Accords and imposed sanctions on Egypt.  He ended his longstanding feud with Syrian President Hafiz al Assad.  He became the first Iraqi head of state to visit Jordan in twenty years.  This visit between Hussein and King Hussein of Jordan allowed for Iraq to have access to the port of Aqabah.[12]

The Iran-Iraq War:

            Before the overthrow of the Shah in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saddam Hussein reached out to the Shah to help mend tensions.  In March 1975, Hussein signed an agreement with the Shah that finally settled the border dispute between the two nations that had not worked in 1937 or in 1969.  Part of this agreement was for the Shah to prevent subversive elements from crossing the border into Iraq.  The majority of the subversive elements had been Kurds that Iraq had to contend with for the majority of the 1970s.  Without the aid of Iran, the Kurds were quickly rounded up by the Iraqi forces and eliminated.[13]

            With the Iranian Revolution, the peace agreement that had been in place between Iran and Iraq seemed to have fallen apart.  Hussein saw the new Islamist regime as both an opportunity and a threat.  Hussein feared that the new Shi’a regime would promote the Shi’a majority in Iraq to revolt and try to overthrow Hussein’s regime.  In July 1979 riots broke out in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala after the government to allow the Ayatollah Baqir to lead a procession to Iran to congratulate Khomeini.[14]  Despite the fear of Shi’a uprisings, Iraq sent their best wishes to Khomeini and the Iranian people on the establishment of the Islamic Republic.  Iraq invited the first president of Iran, Mehdi Bazargan to improve bilateral relations, but due to the rise of militant preaching by Khomeini, this caused the relationship between the two nations to end.

            Starting in 1980, after unsuccessful attempts by a Shi’a extremist group Ad Dawah to assassinate high ranking Baath Party leaders, including the foreign minister Tariq Aziz and minister of culture and information Latif Nayyif Jasim, Hussein rounded up and deported members and executed the leader.[15] 

            The two nations started border skirmishes in September 1980, which led to increased hostility and eventual bombing raids on both sides.  On September 23, Iraqi troops marched into Iranian territory.  The war that ensued from Western sources seemed to be nothing more than the ancient Arab-Persian feud that had been going on for centuries.  There was more to the war than just one old grudge.  This war continued the Shi’a-Sunni conflict and personal animosity between Hussein and Khomeini.  In 1977, Khomeini was expelled from Iraq by the Baath Party after spending fifteen years in Najaf.  Khomeini felt that the Shi’as in the shrine cities were being exploited by the Baath Party and vowed revenge.[16]

            When Iraqi military planners had gathered intelligence on the situation in Iran, they believed that they could win a quick war.  Despite the population of Iran being much larger than Iraq, the Iraqi military was much better equipped in terms of arms and mobile infantry.  The weapons and tanks that the United States had given Iran under the Shah had been left to rust, but the one place that the Iraqis believed Iran had an advantage was their air force.  The air force had some of the most sophisticated aircraft that had been made in the United States.  To prevent the Iranian air force from mobilizing, the Iraqi air force launched massive bombing raids to destroy the runways, fuel depots, and hangers.  Unfortunately for the Iraqis, the bombing raids did little to destroy the Iranian air force due to the strength of the hangers to repel Iraqi bombs. 

            Iraq mobilized their nearly 200 thousand men, 2,200 tanks, and 450 airplanes and launched a three front attack on Iran.[17]  In the first few weeks the Iraqi army crushed the Iranian army and captured major cities within Iran.  The Iranian military command had been purged and executed by the new regime and what remained was not well trained.  Despite the inadequacies in the Iranian military, they were able to keep the Iraqi army from reaching Tehran.  After a counterattack failed to stop Iraqi forces in 1981, they managed to push Iraqi troops back in 1982 and kept pushing them back until 1984. 

            By the end of 1984 after nearly four years of fighting a combined 550 thousand troops had been killed or wounded.  Between 1984 and 1987 the war turned into a war of attrition, where neither side managed to take much ground and lost thousands of soldiers.  Fearing what either superpower would do, both the United States and the Soviet Union sold arms and supplies to both sides.  This allowed Hussein to create weapons that had not been widely used since World War I.  Hussein created and used chemical and biological weapons and attached them to bombs, shells, and rockets against the Iranian forces.

            With increasing pressure from the United Nations to end the war after reports that chemical and biological weapons had been used.  Iraq made one final push to try and decisively end the war.  From April to August 1988, Iraq launched Operation Blessed Ramadan to finally end the war.  The operation successfully pushed the Iranian forces back, but failed to make a decisive blow.  In August 1988, after eight years of fighting, Iran and Iraq formally agreed to a ceasefire when Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598.   The estimates for the war included nearly one million dead, many thousands wounded, and millions became refugees.  Despite the victory by Iraq, they failed to get many of issues that started the war resolved.[18]

Bibliography:

Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+iq0024%29 accessed 4/30/12).

            This article focused on the specifics of each battle and the different military tactics that were used by both sides of the war.

Iraq: The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-1979.  (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+iq0024%29 accessed 4/30/12).

            This article took a look at the makeup of the early Baath Party and how Saddam Hussein rose to power.

Iraq: The Iran-Iraq Conflict.  (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+iq0024%29 accessed 4/30/12).

            This article focused on the build up and reasons for the Iran-Iraq war.

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. A Country Study: Iraq. Edited by Helen Chapin Metz.  Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1990. (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html accessed 4/30/12).

            This article looked at the layout and organization of the Baath Party in Iraq.

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[1] A Country Study: Iraq

[2] A Country Study: Iraq

[3] A Country Study: Iraq

[4] A Country Study: Iraq

[5] A Country Study: Iraq

[6] Iraq: The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-1979

[7] Iraq: The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-1979

[8] Iraq: The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-1979

[9] Iraq: The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-1979

[10] Iraq: The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-1979

[11] Iraq: The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-1979

[12] Iraq: The Iran-Iraq Conflict. 

[13] Iraq: The Iran-Iraq Conflict. 

[14] Iraq: The Iran-Iraq Conflict. 

[15] Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).

[16] Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).

[17] Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).

[18] Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).